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May, 1953
MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR THE TORT OF
HIS SERVANT'S ASSISTANT *
JOHN S. PFEIFFER
Student, University of Denver College of Law
During the 1951-52 term, the Supreme Court of Colorado
handed down two decisions-Whiteside v. Harvey 1 and Cooley v.
Eskridge 2-which are inconsistent.
In the Whiteside case, the master instructed his servant to
drive the master's truck from Denver to Greeley. The servant took
his father along. The servant turned the truck over to his father.
Such act was against the express will of his employer. The son
then fell asleep. In Brighton, the father negligently crashed the
truck through plaintiff's plate glass window. The plaintiff brought
an action against the master for the damage done. The supreme
court, speaking through Justice Holland, affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiff.
In the Cooley case, the master engaged plaintiff to do certain
grading and filling in accordance with certain specifications.
Plaintiff's men and equipment were utilized in the work. The
master's servant was instructed to see that specifications were
met and to act as time-keeper. The assistant, an employee of an
independent contractor, was also engaged in the work. Plaintiff
at one time told the servant he wished to complete the work and
asked if the servant would work over-time. There was a con-
flict of the testimony upon the matter of who (or whom?) was to
pay the servant for such over-time--the master or the plaintiff.
One morning plaintiff's men did not show up for work. The serv-
ant tried to contact plaintiff, but could not reach him. The servant
asked the assistant to take plaintiff's tractor up a steep hill, so
that it would be ready to go when the men came to work. The
servant went along with the assistant. Because of the assistant's
negligence, the tractor rolled down the hill and was damaged. The
plaintiff brought an action against the master for the damage
done. The supreme court, speaking through Justice Alter, re-
versed the judgment below and instructed the trial court to enter
judgment for the master.
The principle involved in these cases is that of the master's
liability for the tort of his servant's assistant. It might be wise
to discuss, first, the origin of the master's liability for the tort
of his servant.
Let us take a common illustration: The driver of a grocer's
truck negligently runs over another in the street, the person in-
* It is not the province of this note to deal with the servant's implied
authority to seek an assistant in cases of emergency or necessity.
1124 Colo. 561, 239 P. 2d 989 (1951).
........ Colo .......... 241 P. 2d 851, 1951-52 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12. p. 173 (1952).
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jured being without fault. The grocer is liable for the negligence
of his servant, the driver. But why, or upon what principle? It
is sometimes said that the reason for the master's liability in such
cases is his negligence in employing and unskillful servant. If
this were really the true reason, the logical result would be that,
if the master was guilty of no negligence in employing the servant,
he would not be liable. We know, however, that it is no defense
that the master used the greatest care in employing his servant.
Again, suppose an engineer or servant of a railroad company
wilfully ran a train of cars over another person, we know that the
company is liable for the wrongful act of its servant, and it is no
excuse for the company to say it did not authorize the act, or that
it was done without the knowledge or consent of the company, or
against its express will or order.
It is difficult to understand this principle of liability, unless
we approach it from the side of history. It is, in reality, a survival
of the ancient doctrine that the master or owner was liable for the
act of his slave, and for injuries committed by animals in his
possession. The ancient idea was that the family of the master, in-
cluding his slaves, his animals, and all other property, was a unit,
that the personality of the master affected all of his property, and
that, as he was entitled to all the benefits of ownership, he must
accept the consequences flowing from injuries caused by his
property. He might buy off the vengeance of the injured person,
or he might appease it by surrendering the offending property to
the person aggrieved.
In ancient times the masses were slaves; in modern times
the masses are freemen. When slaves became freemen, the master
was shorn of his power to surrender the delinquent, but he still
continues to be liable for the acts of his servant done in the line
of the employment. It may be said that, as the master has ceased
to have any property in his servants, and as he is shorn of his
power to surrender a delinquent, the reason for the rule fails.
This then would result in exonerating the master from all liability
in all such cases
It is true that the power of surrendering the delinquent has
ceased, but it is not true that the personality of the master has
ceased to affect his servants. The will of the master dominates any
given enterprise. He calls to his aid servants and appliances. The
servant surrenders his time, and in a measure permits the will
of the master to dominate and control his actions. He is the in-
strument of his master in accomplishing certain ends. The servant
is placed in the position and given the opportunity to commit the
wrong by the will of the master.
Anciently, the liability of the master was not limited by the
duties imposed upon his slave. When a servant became a freeman,
he was no longer a member of the master's family, and he could
not properly be said to be the representative of his master, except
in the line of the employment. There is still substantial and just
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grounds for the principle that the master is liable for the wrongful
acts of his servant.
The principle of the master's liability for the tort of his serv-
ant's assistant seems to have extended the doctrine of master and
servant. But such a principle is still limited to the acts done within
the scope of the servant's employment and in the furtherance
of the master's business.
In the "truck" case, the court said:3
The responsibility of the owner for the driver's neg-
ligence has been affirmed times without number. Had this
accident occurred through the carelessness or negligence of
the son, the employee driver, under the undisputed facts,
as here, liability of the owner of the truck could not success-
fully be disputed. When this employee driver, without being
confronted with any kind of an emergency, turned over
the operation of the truck to his father, and remained in
the presence of his father while he was driving, the acts
of father became the acts of the employee for which the
employer is liable. The father, as driver, here became
an instrumentality in the hands of his son, and, further,
the truck here involved was on a mission in furtherance
of defendant's business.
Although Justice Holland mentions that the employee was
negligent in letting his father drive the truck, he bases his de-
cision on the master's liability for the tort of his servant's assist-
ant. For he further states that the " . . . defendant's liability
will here rest upon the negligence of the father imputed to the
careless and negligent son ... -4
In the "tractor" case, the court went upon the theory that the
defendant is only liable for the acts of his servant and his servant
only while in the scope of his employment. Therefore, it must be
shown that the servant had the express or implied authority to
hire the assistant and that the act of the assistant was within the
scope of his employment. Justice Alter said.5
The burden of proof was on plaintiff to establish
... that [the servant] had express or implied authority
to employ [the assistant] before any liability whatsoever
could be attached to [the master] as a result of [the
assistant's] negligence. In the absence of express or im-
plied authority, [the servant] could not create the rela-
tionship of master and servant-between [the master] and
[the assistant] so as to make [the master] liable to
plaintiff for damages resulting from [the assistant's]
negligence.
Whiteside v. Harvey, supra. p. 564.
ibid,. p. 564-65.
Cooley v. Eskridge, .supra. p. 854.
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The court then went on to say that express authority did not
exist, nor was there a ratification of the act by the master. The
court answered the remaining problem of implied authority to
hire the assistant by saying "in no event will the agent be deemed
by implication to possess powers that the principal could not him-
self exercise if he were acting personally."'6 Climbing on the tractor
"amounted to a wilful trespass and [was] unlawful; and ... [the
master] is not liable therefor in the absence of express authoriza-
tion ' 7 for the master himself could not lawfully do such an act.
The court, in conclusion, said :"
[The servant's] actions . . . arose by reason of his
arrangement with plaintiff for the payment of his over-
time wages or as the result of a trespass and an unlaw-
ful act. If the former, [the master] is not liable there-
for; if the latter, it having been done without [the mas-
ter's] express authority and not within the scope of his
employment, the same result obtains.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
An English case, Booth v. Mister,9 probably inaugurated the
doctrine. In that case a servant of the master, named Usher, whose
duty it was to have charge of the cart, was riding in the cart
at the time when the accident occurred, but another person, who
was not in the master's service, was driving the cart, Usher hav-
ing given him the reins. Lord Abinger, C. B., in holding the
master liable said :10
As the defendant's servant was in the cart, I think
that the reins being held by another man, makes no dif-
ference. It was the same as if the servant had held them
himself.
In a New York case, Althorf v. Wolfe," the master set his
servant to shoveling snow and ice off from the roof of his house
along the street. The servant procured another person to assist
him, and while they were thus engaged, they threw ice upon a
passer-by and killed him. It did not appear whether the servant or
the assistant threw the ice that produced the injury, and the court
held that it was a matter of no importance, as the master would be
liable in either event. In the court's opinion, Wright, J. said :12
It is not absolutely necessary that the technical re-
lation of master and servant, as between the defendant
'ibid. p. 856 citing 2 C.J.S., Sec. 99(a), p. 1227.
'ibid. p. 857.
'ibid. p. 857.
'7 C & P 66, 173 Eng. Rep. 30 (1835).
10ibid. p. 30.




and [the assistant] should exist, or that [the assistant]
should be able to recover of the defendant for his services,
to make the defendant liable to a third person. If the
injury was the result, substantially, of the negligent act
of [the servant], in the course of his employment in clear-
ing the roof, or if [the assistant] was allowed to be on
the premises by the owner, shoveling snow from the roof
in so negligent a way that a person in the street is in-
jured, or if the defendant had not taken due and proper
care to prevent a negligent or improper person from be-
ing about his premises, and in consequence of this an in-
jury happened to a third person, he is liable.
In a concurring opinion, Denio, J. had the following to say :13
If we keep in mind that the defendant is responsible
for the acts of [the servant], and that [the servant] en-
abled the [assistant] to do the mischief, it is difficult to
discover any principle which will shield the defendant
from responsibility. It is not necessary to consider [the
assistant] as the defendant's servant. He was, rather,
the instrument by which [the servant], for whose con-
duct the defendant was undeniably responsible, did the
wrong.
The above two cases gave rise to the doctrine of the master's
liability for the tort of his servant's assistant. Over a span of
100 years the courts have adopted one of three explanations for
holding the master liable. For the purposes of this note, they are
as follows: (1) the servant is negligent in not controlling the as-
sistant, (2) The assistant is the alter-ego of the servant, and (3)
.The assistant is an instrumentality in the hands of the servant.
The Servant Is Negligence in Not Controlling the Assistant
In a California case, 14 the servant frequently engaged the
assistant to aid him in sending and receiving messages, but the
assistant was never employed by the master. One day while the
servant was not there the assistant sent a message to the plaintiff
to send money which the assistant absconded with. Judgment was
against the master. The decision was on the grounds that the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's loss was the negligence of the servant. It
was part of his duty to keep any unauthorized person from using
the defendant's wires.
He failed to discharge this duty and the [master]
is equally responsible whether the placing of [the assist-
ant] in charge was a wrongful act committed as part
of the transaction of the business, or was mere negli-
gence. 15
'*ibid. p. 365-66.
"Bank of California v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 Calif. 280 (1877).
"ibid. p. 291-92.
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In Thyssen v. Davenport Ice & Cold Storage Co.,16 the Iowa
court said in a dictum:
. . . the one safe and logical ground upon which to
rest the liability of a master for the negligence of a vol-
unteer assistant of his servant is the negligence of the
servant in inviting or permitting a stranger to perform,
or assist in the performance of, the work which was in-
trusted to his own hand. Where such negligence is shown
with injury proximately resulting therefrom to a third
person, who is himself without fault, the master is liable
under the familiar rule which imputes to him the negli-
gence of the employee in the course of his employment.
In Englehart v. Farrant,7 the master instructed his servants
X and Y (a boy of 17) to go in a wagon and deliver packages. X
was instructed to drive and not to leave the cart unattended. X left
the cart to get oil for his lamp. Y drove the wagon to plaintiff's
injury. The court held that it was negligent for X to leave the
cart as it was forseeable that Y should drive it to the injury
of plaintiff and that this was the proximate cause of the injury.
In Copp v. Paradis,i" the master's truck-driver, Tancread,
while engaged in his master's business, permitted a friend, Car-
penter, to ride with him and drive the truck, without the authority
of the master. Due to the negligence of Carpanter, who was a
competent driver, the truck struck the plaintiff's car and injured
him. The Maine Court held that Carpenter, although negligent,
was not the servant of the master and that Tancread was not
.negligent, or if he were his negligence was not the proximate cause
of the accident.
The Tennessee Court,19 reasoned as follows:
• . . should the jury find that young Potter's death
was due to the negligent operation of the truck, that
Potter was not guilty of contributory negligence, and
that [the servant] was guilty of negligence in permitting
[the assistant] to drive the truck, then the grocery com-
pany would be liable. Or if the jury should find that [the
servant] was not guilty of negligence in permitting [the
assistant] to drive the truck, but that [the servant] was
supervising his conduct, and in so doing was guilty of
negligence, then in that event the grocery company would
be liable. [Italics added.]
In Gates v. Daley. 20 the master was the owner of a truck and
16134 Iowa 749, 112 N. W. 177, 178 (1907).
17 1 Q. B. 240 (1897).
Is 130 Me. 464, 157 Atl. 228 (1931).
19 Potter v. Golden Rule Grocery Co., 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S. W. 2d 364, 366
(1935) see Conway v. Pickering, 111 N. J. L. 15, 166 Atl. 76 (1933).
"0 54 Calif. A. 654, 202 P. 467 (1921), see Johnson v. Steele, 154 Or. 137, 59
P. 2d 237 (1936) and Keen v. Clarkson, 56 Ari. 437, 108 P. 2d 573 (1940).
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had employed the servant to drive it. In the regular course of his
employment, the servant, accompanied by his wife, went on a long
trip in the vehicle. At a point on the journey the servant became
fatigued, and, in order temporarily to rest himself, allowed his
wife to operate the truck. While she was at the wheel, an accident
occurred in which the plaintiff was hurt. The court, in awarding
judgment for the plaintiff, said that the servant had no authority
from the master to engage a substitute or assistant to drive the
truck, but that his wife's negligence was imputed to him, and
from him to the master.
In a Wisconsin case,2 the servant was a ticket agent of the
master. The servant's brother, while acting as agent, struck plain-
tiff. It was said that as the person who did the injury was in the
ticket office performing the duties of ticket agent with the consent
and under the direction of the person employed in that capacity,
his act must be regarded as an act of the master's servant.
Although it appears that the servant must be present at the
time of the act, some courts have gone further. In Emison v.
Wylam Ice Cream Co.,2- the Alabama court said:
... when the servant has been intrusted with an in-
strumentality which he is instructed to use in the prosecu-
tion of the master's business, we think it is sound, both
in principle and in policy, to hold the master responsible
for the servant's injurious use of that instrumentality
in the performance of his authorized service, even though
the servant has intrusted the particular service to the
hands of a third person, who was acting for him and
under his direction; and, in such a case, we can recog-
nize no valid distinction between a case where the servant
was present with his assistant at the time and place of
the accident and a case where the servant was elsewhere.
In each case the servant uses the instrumentality for the
purpose intended and authorized, and in each case the
directed act of the assistant is equally the act of the
servant.
The Assistant in an Instrumentality in the Hands of the Servant
In Hill v. Sheehan,2 3 the master instructed his servant to take
two horses to a certain place. The servant sought help from the
assistant, against the express will of the master. The assistant's
negligence in handling the horse caused plaintiff's injury. The
court in holding the master liable said :24
It is insisted that [the assistant] was in no sense
defendant's servant, and consequently he cannot be made
Fisk v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 68 Wisc. 469, 32 N. W. 527 (1887).
215 Ala. 504, 111 So. 216, 218 (1927).





liable for his acts. This over-looks the fact that by the
act of the servant who was in charge, an instrument i.e.
[the assistant], was used for the prosecution of the mas-
ter's business, and that such instrument inflicted the in-
jury. It is not essential, under such circumstances, that the
relation of master and servant should exist, in order to
fasten responsibility. It is sufficient when it appears that
the master's business is being prosecuted by the instru-
ment used.
In Bluminfeld v. Meyer-Schmid Grocer Co.," 5 the Missouri
court said:
The courts have frequently placed the liability of the
the master upon the ground that a stranger, to whom
the servant has.delegated his duties, is a mere instrumen-
tality by which the servant performs such duties, and
that therefore the stranger's negligence is that of the
servant. This doctrine appears to be sound enough when
applied to a case where the servant does not delegate his
duties in the entirety, but remains present and the duties
performed by the stranger are preformed under the eye
and the immediate supervision of the servant ...
COURTS AND CASES THAT REFUSE TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE
In Butler v. Mechanic's Iron Foundry' Co.,26 the servant al-
lowed his assistant to ride on the truck and drive it in violation
of the master's instructions. The assistant drove on the wrong
side of the road and in consequence thereof collided with the plain-
tiff's car. Judgment was for the master. The court, in essence,
said that the servant could not delegate his duties, and, therefore,
his permission to his assistant to ride on the truck and drive it, was
without the scope of his authority.
In Haluptozk v. Great Northern Ry.,27 the court said:
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master,
however careful in the selection of his servants, is respon-
sible to strangers for their negligence committed in the
course of their employment. The doctrine is at best some-
what severe, and, if a man is to be held liable for the acts
of his servants, he certainly should have the exclusive
right to determine who they shall be. Hence, we think,
in every well-considered case where a person has been
held liable, under the doctrine referred to, for the negli-
gence of another, that other was engaged in his service
either by the defendant personally, or by others by his
authority, express or implied.
206 Mo. A. 509, 203 S. W. 132, 137 (1921).
-'259 Mass. 560, 156 N. E. 720 (1927).
2755 Minn. 446, 57 N. W. 144, 145 (1893), but see Geiss v. Twin City Taxicab
Co., 120 Minn. 368, 139 N. W. 611 (1913).
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In Long v. Richmond, 28 the New York court said:
We conceive of no rule of law or of equity which will
permit a servant, in violation of his master's instruction
and without his knowledge or consent, to allow other
persons to do his work which he is employed to do, with-
out any necessity therefor, and thus make the master
liable for the negligent acts of such other persons.
COLORADO CASES
In the "truck" case, the facts state that the defendant ex-
pressly told his servant not to let any other person drive the truck.
The facts also state that the son fell asleep and was not actually
directing or controlling the father. Therefore, in essence, the
supreme court has extended the rule to the point that the master
is liable for all acts of the servant's assistant committed while in
the servant's scope of employment, and the mere fact that the
master instructs the servant not to seek help or the servant leaves
the scene is not enough to take such without the scope of his em-
ployment.
In the "tractor" case, the supreme court refused to base
their decision upon the doctrine laid down in the "truck" case, but
discussed the problem of whether the servant had the implied
authority to hire the assistant for the master and, therefore, make
the assistant a servant of the master. It is submitted that the facts
would fall under the above doctrine much more readily than the
facts of the "truck" case.
Assuming that the servant was such of the master,29 the
servant engaged an assistant to drive the tractor to the top of a
hill. The servant walked to the top of the hill along side the
tractor. The servant started to get the tractor ready for work
when the mishap occurred. At all times the servant was instruct-
ing the assistant and was the guiding hand of the assistant. The
master had not expressly told the servant not to seek assistance.
Therefore, all the requirements for the above doctrine are met
except for one. Was the assistant acting within the scope of the
servant's employment at the time of the mishap? The supreme
court said no, for both the assistant and the servant were com-
mitting a wilful trespass and an unlawful act, which takes them
out of the scope of the servant's employment.
Justice Alter cites as his authority Sager v. Nuckolls.30 In
68 N. Y. App. Div. 466, 73 N. Y. S. 912, Aff. 175 N. Y. 495. It might be of
interest to point out that New York cases will fit into all categories of this
note. See Althorf v. Wolfe, supra. Simons, v. Monier, 29 Barb. 417 (1859),
William v. Miner, 19 Misc. 644, 44 N. Y. S. 417 (1897) and Hill v. Sheehan,
supra.
"The problem as to whether the servant was such of the defendant or of the
plaintiff will not be discussed as it would be purely a jury question.
"Colo. A. 95, 32 P. 187 (1893), see Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Ryan,
17 Colo. 98, 28 P. 79 (1891), and Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. Mills, 21 Colo.
A. 582, 122 P. 798 (1912).
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that case a wife brought an action against the master for the
wrongful death of her husband caused by the servant. The servant
"way-laid" the victim and shot him to death. The court asked
the question, Was this act "in the line of [the servant's] duty and
in the furtherance of the master's business?"31 The court ruled as
a matter of law that the servant was not within the scope of his
employment, but was on a frolic of his own and that the malice
was all his and not that of the master. It is submitted that there
is a difference between- the "unlawful" act of murder, and the "un-
lawful" act of trespass, if it is such. If all "unlawful" acts take
the servant out of the scope of his employment, the master would
never be liable for the tort of his servant if such tort was committed
while speeding, driving carelessly, running a stop-light, or cutting
the wrong trees. Is not running through a plate glass window a
trespass and an "unlawful" act? Suppose the father in the "truck"
case did not have a chauffeur's license, would this relieve the
master of liability? The act of letting the father drive under those
circumstances was something that the master could not lawfully do.
The two cases are inconsistent.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of the master's liability for the tort of his
servant's assistant does not extend the already severe rule of the
master's liability for the tort of the servant. It is still limited to
the worn out maxim: The master is liable for the torts committed
within the scope of the servant's employment. The acts by the
servant of seeking assistance, going against the express will of the
master, committing unlawful acts and many others are only facts
for the jury to consider in deciding whether the servant was
within the scope of his employment. If an assistant is selected by
a servant to do an act within the scope of the servant's employment
and in the furtherance of the master's business and while such
assistant is doing such, commits a tort, the master is liable whether
you label it the servant is negligent in not controlling the assist-
ant; or the assistant is the alter-ego of the servant; or the assistant
is an instrumentality in the hands of the servant.
TAX NOTE FOR LAWYERS
In a decision handed down on April.14, 1953, the U. S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the second circuit held that an attorney may
deduct the expenses of a postgraduate law course for federal in-
come tax purposes. The test case was taken to the court of appeals
by George C. Coughlin of Binghampton, New York, who incurred
$305 of expenses in attending a tax course at New York University
in 1946. The New York State Bar Association and the American
Medical Association intervened in the case as amicis curiae.
.ibid. p. 103.
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